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l. 
lNl'RODUCTlON 
In March 1989 the Law Commission s ubmiLLed it s seventh reporL 
to the Minlster of JusLj ce. G:ntitled The S LrucLure of Lhe 
Courts, one of its staled prjmdry purposes was 
to de Lcrmin e Lhe most dc~sj r clb Le s Lru c:L ur () of the 
judi c l a l system of N w 7.e;:i l a nd jn thP event Lhat th e 
Judl c ial CommiLtee of Lhe Prjvy Co unci l C~dses Lo be 
the f i n a l a pp e l l iJ Le L r· i bun a J for New 7, ea l c1 n d . [ 1 l 
Obviously such a compr'ehens ive review of Ne w %ea l a nd' s cou1 l 
structure e ntailed an examination of the uppeal business of 
the courts. 1\ppropr ia Le l y Lhe [,aw Cornrni ss ion look l h e 
oppor·tunj t y to ask fund a me nLal questions about the naLure 
of appeals. They l ooked at Lhe hisLory of apoea l s in thc--> 
EnqLish common law tr aditlon, La rg e l y inheriLcd by r~ew Zeci l und, 
a nd traced c hanges in ap~elJr1te Utigation Lo the presenL 
day. 
This paper critically examines the observa tions of the Law 
Commission. The role of oppellate trjbunals qC'nerally will 
be dtscussed. In parti c ular the apparanL t e nsi o n thaL now 
exists betwee n their role as forums for djspule resolutior1 
in the adversarial tradition and the ir undi spuLe d wjder r o le: 
as overseers. interpreters and Jndeed makers of Lhc Jaw wiJ l 
be exp lored. Th;=it discussion will set the scene for n Look 
at the specJfic issue of the number of appeal s that shouJd 
be ava i_Jabl e in our court structure a nd Lhe future c har;=icter· 
of the Court of Appea l s hou ld it become o ur · highest court . 
Finally, difficulties i n the r ecornm e nd aL i ons or the La1,,• 
Commis sion on Lhese ma Lters 1,1i 11 be highJ iqllled, part i c ul.Jr·l y 
i n re 1 a ti_ on Lo a pp ea l s f rom r i r s t i n s t ,'Ill c e de c i s i ons i n L h c 
High Co ur·t. 
HJSTORY Of APPEALS 
The r i g h t of a pp ea l i s a c re c1 t u re of s ta Lu L c ,1 n d t1 s s u ct1 i s 
to be disLinguishe d from the common lA w power- of- review. ( 2 ! 
The common l aw was no lover of appea l s. [ndecd i L h;=id, j n 
the words of the Law Cornmlssio11, "a n aversion to appeals."[ '3 ] 
Thus the re L-1 Lively s i rnpl e a nd co he r ent appca l sys Le m we know 
today did not exisl jn England as LnLe ns Lh o second tJ,qJ f 
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2. 
of I as t century. There \'l/;:1s ;-in <'-l pped I p r·ocess of :-;or ts, but 
it., ''1,,'as archaic, disordered Gnd hor·derinq un U1e ch,:wUc.''L 1lJ 
One re8son \'I/as that lhere had developed ovt~ r lh< centuries 
several j ud i c j a J he it cir eh i es and lh,, emerqcncc oi <1 '-;cp;lT', Jt,c 
equitable jurisdiction in the rourts or Chnnccr·v fl.lrtlwr 
compl.icated the process.[:>] 
The appellate procedure that exisled was limiled in scope. 
Indeed, given that the merits of the case \ver·e not., even 
considered i. t seems difficult to describe the process as nn 
'appeal' . It was based upon the \'1/r i. L of errt)r ,_rnd depended 
"upon the existence of nn error on l.he record of pr·oceedi nqs 
in the lm-ver court. "L6] Jf such an err·or h'u':. founrl. tile suµE"rior 
court reviewed the dee is ion r1.nd quashed it, no mat. Ler· 1101,,1 
smaJ J or incidental the mistake anct des pi lt~ ll1e ov<~ra 11 j us l i c:c 
of such a result.,. L7] 
Th is rather· embryonic procedure bore no rcsemb lane:, t:.o l•:uropc'<1r1 
practice. ContLnental appeal courls always plciypd ,1 sjqnif ic,rnt. 
role in their legal systems. One reoson, jt. hus been su(Jgestnd, 
js that their trial courts wece scattered and locol judicinJ 
off..icers required supervision by centralised appeal co1ffts. 
A contj_nental appeal was a true r hearing, or u - ic11 de novo, 
and took that form to enable 
conLinental regimes Lo irnpuse a uni tcnm nr1d ccnlr,il isc>d 
Roman lr1\v on loc,..11 courts LI\ pJr1ce of" LhE} loL',ili·ed. 
custornary law they had been empJoying in lh mc.' diPval 
period. [8] 
\,Jhy was Snq lj sh appel la.Le procedure, by conlr·a.st.,, so l j mi led ? 
Firstly, EngJ;_-md's trial coilrts w0.re themselves quiLP 
centralised and their j ud4es a grecJ t deal mo ( ' C P0\'1/Cr f"u J . 
Secondly, the strong oral tradition j n Fng l i sh cuur ts rn ,-1de 
appeals less feasible. The wrj_tl.en record of an r~ngl ish tri,il 
\v as scan t y , o u t l i n i n g on l y L he l e q ,, J c l a i ms o f the pal ti e s 
and the court's findLngs. Lengthy writter1 judgme nLs were lhe 
exception r,--i.thcr than the ru l(:. Tllr)s e fe:-:iLut ·es or fi:nq l i sh 
procedure sprung from a concern J-or c f 1 i <~ i Pncy; a des i. re Lo 
keep the j u d i c i QI process q u i c 1-.: n n d c 11 c u p . l 9 J 
By the J ate nineteenth C8ntur·y mc-1 jor reforms of t-i:nq ldnd' s 
courts ~,,_iere embarked upon. Th e ,1 ud ica tm e Ac ls 1 8'n - 7~> 
cornpl e te l y rest.rue turec.1 tile sys Lem. /\ sing I e Cour L o l Apper1 l 
• 
-----~--------::, 
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was cTe;:1ted and thR appeal 1tJc1s [oundf::'<i noL 11pon Uw ,vril oC 
error bul was Lo be by way of 'rehear·inq'. Thr1.t., indP<:d j s 
thP posit.ion in Ne\.J Zcc1 land todclY. Hu l ,) T7 <) f l hti Corn L u t" 
Appe ;, L RulP.s sLaLcs Lklt ",1 I l appeal s shul l b (_' b,· \,,1i"J';, rJ[ 
reh e ar·ing. ''i 101 The Lenn 'rf:heariny' is, il stiould i.){~ nul(Jd, 
something of a misnumPr. The vnsL m,ijoriLy oJ .Jpfw;-1Js s imply 
exam i.ne the proceed in<JS of Lhe tr· ia L r:ourr , 1nd ,n ,p I y t h._1 l H\ -1 
as it stands c1 t the Li me oJ lhe cippeE-i I Lo Uw r nc t s f ()unci 
by the J. m-ier court. 'J'lle New Zeo land Co1,; r· L. of Ap(:lc'a L h,:1.s U11c, 
power to admit further evidencerJll but •Jl!jll ()nly usunJly 
do so where it is i mporbrn t. and h;.1s come to J j q tll s i r!cf~ Lhe 
tr i a L. 1 n f.:1c t it is excGp L iuna l r or · fresh l'V i dt'nc:c lo b1-~ 
heard on appeuL or for 1r1itnesses Lo bt~ e xnmin '2d <ir n ~-''X rJmir,cd. 
ln Lhe vast. maiority of cjrc umst,rnces the apr,c cd wtl L b e· 
conduct.ea on tlH~ record of the <-'v i den cc of t h,; c ou r· l he low. ! J 7 I 
/\ppenJ COllt'Ls ,1t·e cmpo1,s1cr,~d Lo mcike r·indinn ~ ')f p1 · irn,H' Y f,1cL 
them s e J v e s a n d t. o d r c1 w L n fer en c e s f n; m J :ic l '.-; . I 1 >. I r n p r , w L i c t' , 
ho1.s1ever, they arc very reluctant. lo inl c t·fL!r·,., 1r,:i Lh f i.ridi11qs 
of primary fact IJy trial jtidqc's, pc1r ·Licularlv ~-l11> :<.; c1 b ;l <;,,d 
upon assessments of credibjlity. Another uYPc"l it\ 1.,;hir.·h :·1ppcc1l 
courts are relucLant to tread is cl re v iew of .::, l o 1,1c r couct 
juciqe's exercise of discretion. Ov,-::rturninq such c n c x c n~is<' 
of discretion 1,,1i l l only be coun Lenarwe d \·Jh c r·r~ t hv cour- t. 
''proceeded on a 1t1rong pri11ciple, qave undue v,n"."> iqllt to somP 
foct.:or or insufficient weight Lo onoLhet' f ,H:Lc)r, ur is pla i II J v 
wcong."flt'J.J 
TI !E ROLE OF /\J ' l:-'EALS I OlM V 
Competing Principles 
Appel Late JjtigatLon as \--ie k1101,-. iL l1 ;1s. in its rcl<1t :v<'1 ,., 
sh()rL exlsLence, assumed consider)blP impor·L.:.n1cc:-i in u111 
judLciaJ syslern. An cxarnirwt\on o( iLs d<:vt>lui,rncnt J11rir,q 
this centur·y involves, r1s Lhe l.d'"'' Connnission poinL out . an 
assessmenL of comreUng principles. [ l')J ·r·ensiori l>elween 
di_f"f8rent bc:1ses for apper1l, pr1ct i Gulai - ly dur·ing recent decad .s, 
hns become more marked as Lhe r·o I c of appec1 l cotH"l s h;.is Q!"m,;n 
cincl deve J Of)ed. 
--------.---~~'<:s~·uc.:ur,0-----------..----------------
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Traditionally. as previously alluded Lo, the common 1;:iw 
sLressed Lhe importance of the trial. Ac inq as a crucial 
buttress to this emphasis is the principle of finality - that 
Litigation is an orderly means of disput·e r·esoluLion. That 
is, Lhe trial verdict represents the resolution of the dispute, 
the end of the matter. That litigation end somewhere, and 
preferably sooner rather than laLer, serves the best interests 
of both the litigants (arguably) and the wider public. Endless 
litigation wastes human and financial resources and acLually 
becomes increasingly irrelevant. By the time protracted 
litigation does end the orjginal dispute may have been subsumed 
by later i. ssues and indeed by the l i ti qa t ion process i Lse 1 f, 
while for the eventual 'winner' the campaign's spoils may 
not come near compensating him for the cost of the battle. 
With a litigation process that after centuries of development 
has become highly formalised and around which a substantial 
culture has developed, it is easy to Jose sLght or its rc1isnn 
d'etre and indeed first pri.orjty: ''the proper resolution of 
par-ticularised disputes."[16] ln an age of 1,1ide riqht,s c1 i 
generaJ ;:ippeal, when Lhe system seems all Loo oCten Lo be 
used cynically and tactically by those with mon ey, such 
fundamentals are easily lost sight of. The Law Commjssjon 
have done well to remind us of those first principles and 
of the possible negative effects of appeals. [17) 
Yet it would be inappropriate to focus nosLaJgi c~lly 011 Lhe 
halcyon days of former centuri8s. Trial courts as a foL·urn 
for dispute resolution between individual litiqants are still 
important and most litigation stiU b gins arid ends jn them. 
However the appeal courts, placed as they ;:ire at the Lop of 
a rigid heirarchy, today exercise many more functions Lh ,rn 
simple dispute reso]utlon. These other functions, which relc1Le i.1S 
mu cll to the constitutional fabr-ic of the nation as to r3.rqumm1ts 
between individual citizens, must be considered in an analys_is 
of the role of appeals. The Law Commission discuss th,)se 
"competing prLncjples'' under two main h ~a ds: _jusUce for the 
individual litigant and clarification nd development 01· LhR 
law. 
---------,------si::ru~~ure 
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,Justice for Lhu .Tndividual Li tiganL 
This reason for appeals focuses on the primary importonce 
of the indivLdual j_n the process. Jts jmpor·tance ls 
par t;icu .t ar J.y evi..den t in t.he c r· i mi na J arena. r ndeed an appea J 
agajnst a criniinaJ conviction has gained tl1P sLdlus of a civil 
right. New Zealand has ratified. and is thus bound to give 
effect to, the lnternatiorial Ccvernrnt on Ci..viJ. ,:rnd PoliUc2.l 
Hights. ArU.c1e 14(5) of t.hu jnternational nqreement stdt.es 
Lhat 
Everyone convicted of A crJme shall have the right 
to his conviction and senLAnce beiny revJe1,,1ed in a 
tdgher tribunal according to law.[19) 
Where Lhe liberty of the indjvjdt1al is involvPd (and in some 
n a t· i ons the e .l i m j_ !la t i on o f the i n d j v i du a l ) a s i. t i s t o I l ow i n g 
mony crimJ.naL convictions, c1 just legal systmn should provide 
an appeal. Tho apµeal right serves to reduce Lhe "dctn9cr 
of an incorrect conviction of a crime or an unjusLified 
sfrn tenc:e. " [ 20 J 
1 t i s a .L so :L m po r tan t t ha t i n d L\d du a l. c i v i 1 1 i t i g <1 n Ls h r1 v e 
an opportunity to appeal e rroneous dee i sj ons. \,/hi le the 
consequences are not as severe as for lhP. cr· irnj nc:11 convict, 
they are st.il.l si0nificant, An appeal p1ovidc-: s "R pmverCul 
corrective to any sensn of grievance 1r;hich Lhc losi ny J,c:JrLy 
may feel"[7lJ fo1Jowi11<J n.n erroneous dec ision. 
Provision for c orrectio11 of judi c i.,,.J decjsjons by w,1y c,f rii:1p0c1! 
ts al.so in Lhe State's interest. The judiciul c:::;ysLem must 
be seen a <:' ,.:, i us t, f aj_r and possessed of in tcq l- i Ly. l t nt.·eds 
to have, j f not the approval of Lhe populace, Lhe11 c1 L lE'iJS t 
their tacit Gcceptance. If genuine jndividua1 grjevarn::es cff(j 
not in some 1,;r1y assuaged a wider lack of con C i dcnce j n t rw 
system itself will result. 
Thts nothm or the appeal as ; j means of ccn-rPc ting or vary i r1<J 
f i r s t i n s t, an cc de c i s i ons i s UH·..! mos t l.> ;:1 s l c ll o t L o men t i on 
the o r- j g j n a J re r1 son for El l I ow ·i n g a pp e u l s . J L i s c l e ;-,r J y 
u n des i r a b l e I o r pa ten t 1 y 1r1 r on q de c: j s i ons l c J be u n C' h c1 L i e ri 9 e c1 b L e . 
Jl Ls in the j nterests of both Lhr~ L j tiqc111L Rnd the stat.c~ 
to provide a remedy for i...hc1t injustice. Judqes an-~ Cilllible 
nnd mistakes an" made . The appca l Rt tempts Lo over-corne Lhose 
si:::ruc-cure 
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wenknesses in the sysLem. Further·mor·e, the very n,-it.urri of 
appellate Jitigation, wjlh its focus on speciCic n,-irr-ow leqal 
1 ssues and its oversight· by a number of experienced and 
supposedly J earned j udgcs, means that the cler: is ion 011 <1pr,erll 
i.s likely to be more acceptable and c:or-recL. [22] 
But litigants who lose are very likely to be ciggr i eveci desp i Le 
the _Lack of meri.t jn Lhejr case. /\lartin Shapiro sugyesLs that 
one reason f-or appeals could be ''t:o provid(~ a psycholoqjcal 
ouLlet and a social cover for the loser at Llie trial."[23J 
·1 t may be that appeals are pursued for Lha t r·eason, but. it 
is surely no justification for them. One r·eason for al lo1,1ing 
appeals where there is genuine grievance. about 011 arguably 
jncorn~ct decision is that wider rub1 ic confjdence in L11e 
system is maintuined. Truly unjust declsi.ons are ,1 concE~rri 
not only fort.he actual liti9 ;:mts but. a]s() for interested 
observers. Li 1.: i g ants, h(_.1v1ever, \.Jhose qr j evc1nces hc1 \ie rno r·e 
to do ld Lh 1,1ounded µri.de than with unfc1j r t n~,JtmunL are 
unli_kely to r-eccdve an y pubUc sympathy. f>enying such µeopil' 
an app8al 1,Ji 11 not, thP-r·efore, resu] L i tt ;:iny \-v i der 
disenchantmc~nt. with the judicial systc::111. 
Indeed use of the right of appeG l by b c1d losers 
of saving fa.ce is undesi.rable. The c:reuihi.lily of Lhe Jeqal 
sysl8m could be under1ninerl if apµeaJs were used c onsistenLly 
by litigants as a. means of reduc ing "the psychic shock"[L.4) 
of their loss at the trial. 
Thus Shapiro's obser-vat ion that, CJne reason 1.r1hy appea 1 s have 
developed is to alJow downhe~rted li.tiqrlr1ts nn outlet for 
their annoy,:rnce at _Losing is, il is submitL(.~d, 1,.Jrong. This 
is borne out by the common lav-1' s tract i ti on Al ernphas is on Uw 
trjal and i Ls overs Lon l:.o appeals discuss e d ubove. The \.Jhol<::: 
point of th~ proc:edure l.hd r, dcve .l ope d 1.r1as Ll12 t the t r i ;:i l wds 
the occasion during v:1hic:h the disputcnLs C'oulcJ ·1 ~) L Dff stedm.' 
The trial court: room Wi-)S Lhc pJ i'l.CC' in whj eh J it. i q;:rnt.s' 
differences vJou!d be resolve d CJn c c a11d for ril J and thaL 
j l.md an,(~n Led emµhas is remains t.odil. y. 
Shapiro's poinL does ho\ .. ever serve os a r-emi nd e r t trnt. <'lf.;pea ls 
an-) undoubt.ed ly used for the reuson h su <.iqesLs. Su<. h :-1 use 
has never been i_ n tended but. has dr>vc loped i nc.: j dnn Li:1 l l y. ThP 
si:ruc L.ur~ 
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Law Commission's comments on boLh the r·ole of appeals qenerAlly 
and on the number of appeals that should be Av<1ilab]e seem 
to implicitly acknowledge this mi.suse of the svstem. Their 
concern that litigation should be quick, thAL Lho pr lnciple 
of finality should be observed and thal available rHsour·ces 
should not be squandered serves, jn the context of Lhe 
discuss ion on appeals, as a reminder that appe li a t.e ii Li ga t1 on 
can be both unnecessary and wasteful. 
Unfortunately the Law Commission did noL make the logical 
leap from there into an investigation of tl1e extent to which 
such wasteful lit.ig<'ltion i.s presently tying up the Judicial 
system. Could there be grounds. in the civi L context, for 
limiting the availability of fjrst appeals? If second and 
third appeals can be wasteful presumably a proportion of fJrst 
appeals can be equally pointless. It is a litlle disappointing 
that having asked such fundamenlal questions the Law Commission 
have not pursued them into a more critical examination of 
the court structure; for example by looking aL whether snme 
first appeaJs only by leave might be justi.fJed. 
Clarification and Development of the Law 
In asking the question ''\-;hy appeals?" attention thus far has 
centred on the just resolution of particular disputes. Appec1ls. 
as a mechanism for correcting erroneous fjrsL jnst.ance 
decisions. are one means of ensuring that Lhe i.ndjvidual 
litigant is treated fajrly. This, it has been noLed. 
also serves the interests of the judicial sysLem itself. 
In addition. however, appeals enable the cour·ts at the Lop 
of the heirarchy to perform funct i_ons \.Jhi.ch have increased 
jn importance relatively recently and which ofLen ha\'e very 
littJe to do 1,-1ith the par-ticular dispute in question. The 
Law Commjssion referred to this wi.der role as the clarification 
anrt development 01· the law. [2~] 
As our hejrarchicol court system evolved appeal cour·ts also 
took on the nature of superj or courLs. T\s 011e progressed up 
the hej rarchy t.he judges supposedly became more learned dnd 
their decisions more -authoratative. Many appeals rajsed 
important ]egaJ issues and appellate li.t.igaU.on became the 
8. 
means by which superior appe;:iJ cout·ts resolved those i.ssues. 
Interpretati.on of statutes and deveJopment of the Comrnon La1r1 
ultimately fell to appellate tribunals. The New Zealand 
Secretary of Justice.commented, in his submissi.on Lo the HoynJ 
Commission on the Courts, on the unique role of tho Court 
of Appeal "as a custodtan of the common lav1." [ts function, 
he said, was to ''develop that law in a hurmonious, consistent 
and rational way. "[26) 
Many myths surrounded this creative function of Lho cour·ts 
and judges became masters of euphemism. The Common La\,; v1as 
not 'developed' by judges. rather it was 'declc:ffed'. Slan.::: 
dectsis, the doctrine of preceder1L. was paid J LP service but 
by distinguJshing the instant case from Lhe apparantly bi.ndi.na 
precedent judges could avoid it. In the aren of sLatulory 
interpretation also judges pr-oved adept aL creulivity. Wh e n 
faced with a statutory provision which 011 its facA seemed 
clear aHd unambiguous but with which tlie judyes ciisc1gre ed. 
various contorted means of avoidance were devised. The phrase 
'Parliament cannot have intended' took on a fumil iar ring 
as courts ignor·ed the plain meaning of the words and r e ad 
in their own prinicipJes. 
Before long some judges freely acknowledged their Law-making 
function. Lord Denning has perhaµs been the most we ll kr1own 
senior member of the judiciary "to admit to an innov21tive 
role. ''[27] Indeed he no only admitted to it· but c1t times 
positively flaunted it. This led him into conflict with the 
House of Lords on many occasions. While Master of the Rolls 
he wrote: 
Many proposals have been made by us in Lhe Court of 
Appeal. Tjme crnd again we have ventured out on a nm; 
line: only to be rebuffed by the !louse of Lords. L7-8] 
Some lavJ lords were harsh in thejr criticism of Lorri Denning. 
His attempts to 'fi.11 in the qops' in l egislation were 
described by Lord Simon a.s "a naked usur·pRtion of Lile 
legislative function under the thin tli.sgui.se of 
i.nterpretation.''[29] Ironically these clashes between a 
'liberal' Court of Appeal and a 'reactionary' I-louse of Lords 
::ii L...1.-U\..... L.U...L t;; 
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only served to underscore the fact that judges were not 
independent arbiters as had always been supposed. Indeed some 
writers have argued that their politics, education and social 
backgrounds all bear on the way they decide cases, particularly 
those involving social or moral issues such as race relations, 
homosexuality or the role of trade unions. [30] The dJvergence 
of opinion that emerged in England's top courts, sometimes 
culminating in a three two split in the House of Lords, [31] 
demonstrated just how much power superior court judges had 
and the extent to which policy considerations bore upon their 
decision making. 
The reality of the law-making function of the judiciary has 
also recently been acknowledged by senior New Zealand 
judges. [32] Sir Robin Cooke, President of the Court of Appeal, 
has commented on the many policy cases surfacing ''creating 
a constantly strengthening awareness that our responsibility 
must be to aim at solutions best fittJng the particular 
national way of life and ethos. "[33] Today the innovative 
role of judges is largely accepted, although the extent of 
innovation acceptable is not agreed upon. Lord Devlin ls 
probably representative of those judges who attempt to walk 
a middle road. He has distinguished 
activist judicial law-making - 'keeping pace with change 
in the consensus' - which is acceptable, with dynamic 
or creative, law-making - judges generating change 
in the consensus - of which he disapproves. [34] 
Such rationalisations tend, however, to become pointless 
semantic exercises. Lord Devlin's comments beg the question: 
~oJhat is "the consensus?" Individual judges' perception of 
'the consensus' \vi l l, of course, vary. 'The consensus', l i.ke 
thc1t mysterious creature 'public opinion', is something most 
judges would find difficult enough to objectively identify 
let alone follow or lead. 
It is no coincidence that concomitant with this growing 
awareness that the courts are developers of Lhe law there 
have been significant changes in the nature and amount of 
appellate litjgation. Since World War TI society has become 
more complex. The state, particularly through comprehensive 
social welfare schemes, has become much more involved j_n the 
li.ves of individual citizens and in the economy. The wurld 
l O. 
of commerce has changed radicaJ]y. The oulpul. of our 
legi.slature has increased dramatically. Not surprisingly legal 
issues have also become more complex. Judges ir1 rccenL decudes 
have been faced with problems for whJch Lhcre co uld no t 
possibly have been precedents. 
ln addition society has become more Utiqjous. Si_c Ivor 
Richardson reported in 1905 Lhat jn the CourL of 7\ppeal ,. Lile 
volume of business ~as increased fou1 ·-fold in twenty five 
years. "[35) All this demonstrates that Lhe law-making function 
of appeal courts, both in developme nt of Lhe Common La\•/ and 
in the interpretntion of statutes, has become increa.sinc.,ly 
important. It is not clear wllelher thjs change lias been judge-
Jed or if judges have merely responded to the expectutions 
placed upon them by a rapidly cllanqing socj ety. I n tTu th these 
changes have probably been both led by and demanded of judges. 
As a footnote to this disc ussion on Lhn role L)f appeal cu1-1r-l.s 
as law-makers it is important to note Lhat bound up ·w·iLh Ll 1at 
function is Lhe top court's role as s upervisor and ovc~rseer 
of the entire court system . Judges in courts or first jnsLcrnce 
look to the superior app e llate courts fur J,~adership in Lhe 
re so l u t i on of d i f f i c u l t q u e s Li u n s o t l a 1,,,1 • The pro v i s j on o J 
appea1s and the work of cippel1ote tribunals sel-ves 
to compel judges and ol.rWl' judicial off j ccrs to be 
more careful whern making decisions al fjrst insL,rnc.:c 
and to be judicial and reasom1ble and Lo apply the 
law and not to be arbitrar-y. [3FiJ 
Discussion, thus far, has brief ly traced Lhe t' oJe of etppC'c1ls 
historically and their development since nineLeenLh centt.n-y 
reforms . While today appeals an~ still brought . by individual 
litigants whose aim is a fjnal resolution of Ltieir d:ispute, 
appellate litigation i.s also Lh c context in ,,.; 11 .ic h judges 
perform other wLder hmctions. ln parLi.cular Lhe role of judoes 
as law-makers, to a greater or lE~sse r· degree, hRs been more 
readily acknowledged in recent decades. Ttiis ~roalive role 
has fallen mo-re noticeably to appf'Jlr1.tP judg<:)S dS Lhey sil 
towards the top of the judic Lal he Lrarchy arid hiJV(~ a 
supervisory and error ~orrecling 10\e. 
Th i. s creative function w i l. ! be ex plored mcn ·e f u I J y ,'Hid t lie 
tension between this role of the courts and Lheir r·aison d'otrc 
• 
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as resolvers of li. tigan ts' disputes 1r1i l l be examined . Later 
the implications of this creative role for the court structure 
itself will be looked at in the context of a discussior1 about 
the number of appeals that should ideally be available and 
the nature of the top court. 
TENSION IN THE SYSTEM 
The framework laid down by the Law Commission has been used 
as a basis for discussion on the role of appeals today. The 
Commission's heading "competing principles" is, it can be 
seen, quite apt. Appeals had their origin ir1 a desire to see 
that the individual litigant was treated fairly by being given 
a chance to have an erroneous trial decision r·eversed or 
varied. A mechanism by _which incorrect decisions could be 
altered also served the interests of the state. The focus, 
it should be remembered, was still on the individuals involved; 
on the just resolution of particular disputes. 
Appeal courts also had the job of developing the Commo11 Law, 
although this 1r1as played down and even denied. This law-mc1kin9 
function has, however, assumed much greater significance in 
our court system over the last fifty years and the result 
has been an emerging tension between the various functior1s 
of appellate litigation. 
Often. on appeal, the rarefied legal questions thrashed out 
between bar and bench have little to do with the dispute that 
originally brought the matter to trial~ Indeed usually all 
questions of fact have been well and truly resolved, the appeal 
court merely deciding what the law is or should be on a 
particular point. By this stage the litigation arguably has 
less to do with ensuring justice between the individual 
litigants (who remain, of course. integral in the process) 
than it has with the coherent development of the law gen rally. 
The Law Commission pointed this out in the conLext of a 
commentary on the practice of granting leave to appeal. They 
noted that the test for granting lec1ve often asks whet.Iler 
the question of law at issue is one of genernl jmJJor·tance 
or "a matter of significunt public interesL.''[37] 
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The resolution of a particular dispute thus becomes not so 
much the end in itself but a means to a greater end - the 
clarification and development of the law. Apµeal courts will 
use the litigation in this way eiLher because the trial court 
has deviated from the law and needs to be brought back inlo 
line or because there was no law applicable and the appeal 
has assumed the task of 'developing' it. [38] In the words 
of Lord Elwyn-Jones: 
... an appeal court's ruling upon a question of law 
goes beyond the functions of doing justice between 
the parties and acquires public importance as a binding 
declaration of what the law is. [39] 
Thus, despite Lord Devlin's protestalions thaL the first 
priority of appeal courts is the~ "proper resolution of 
µarticular i sed disputes between in<li vi duals'', the rea I i ty 
is that often dispute resolution is incidental to the court's 
wider public role of developing and interpreting the law. 
The Law Commjssion acknowledged this by observing thFlL on 
occasion "the parties to the original proceedings mi.gh t no 
longer have any real interest in the matter 1,,1hen it qets to 
its final examination in the courts . . . . '' [ 40 J The courL is, 
certai nly, performing its development role in the context 
of resolution of a particular dispute. Yet in re~lity Lhe 
litigants (from the court's point of viewJ may have become 
quite incidental, their specific concerns now subsumed by 
matters of importance for the wider public interest. ln the 
words of Martin Shapiro: 
... the study of appellate courts mak sit clear Lhat 
courts always exist in a state of tension between their 
basic source of legitimacy as . . . rcso l vers u f cc)t) f 1 ict 
and their position of government agencies imp•.Js j ng 
law upon the citizenry. [41J 
One does not have to agree with Shapiro's rroposi.ti.on that 
courts are instruments of the po} itical regime Lo ackno1,Jledge 
the tension between the two primary ro les of appeal courts, 
conflict resolving and la1,,1-rnald.ng. That Lension, Ud.s \ffitor 
will later contend, has jmportant implications for Lhc 
structure of our courts and for Lhe number of appeals thc1t 
ideally should be available. 
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Characterisjng Appeals 
There is a dan<,Jer, of course, that a recogni ti.on of lhc 
different functions of appellatA litigaLion will lead Lo an 
overly-rigid categorisation of cases; that is, between cases 
involving clarification or development and cases in which 
the appeal (legally speaking) appears relatively routine and 
dispute resolution is the focus. In both the United States 
and Canada it appears that ~ommentators on and arct1itects 
of the judicial system occasionally fall into this trap. 
In both jurisdictions there have been numerous examinatJons 
of the judicial system because of the problc~m of overcrowding. 
In many states this has resulted in the creation of an 
intermediate Court of Appeal, the Lntention heing that some 
pressure is taken off the top court in the state heirarchy. 
Even that, however, has not always proved sufticier1t and the 
suggestion has been made that cdses be allocated quite 
strictly, according to their "type", between Lhe Lwo n.ppP.RI 
courts or between different divisions of Lhe one court. [42] 
An example is to be found in Canada. ln 1977 Lhe special 
Committee on the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
released their findings. Having examined Lhc overcrowding 
problem in the Supreme Court they concluded Lhc1t Lile only 
solution was an increase in the number of jusLjces boll\ 
immediately and in the fuLure as Lhe need arose. They 1r1er·e 
mjndful, however, of what this would do to Lhe r1aLure of th e 
Supreme Court. "Collegial i.ty, consistency and disci.pJ ined 
creativity'', L43] hallmarks of a top appellate c ourt. would 
be compromised in an 2morphous court silting in several panc~ls. 
''A small, unified court is a prerequisite to effectjve law 
development. "[44J They decided therefore, because of these 
problems, to recommend a bifurcation of the Court. of l\ppeal. 
The bifurcation proposed would divide the courL into two 
sections: Juristj c and General. Th e Ge neral Section \..Jou l d 
speedily dj.spose of "ordinary'' appeals while the Juristic 
section "would devote its Lime to the resoJuLi.on of C<'Juses 
implying some 'law-developing' element. "[45] The Committee's 
proposals demonstrate the extent to which the dual role of 
appeals has emerged in some jurisdictions. It highl i.qhLs the 
LAW LIBRARY 
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fact that many appeals have an jmportance for the legal system 
that extends far beyond the immediate concerns of the 
individual litigants. 
Yet while an acknowledgement of this dual role is important, 
the ,distinction can be taken too far. MacDonald, in his 
commentary ori the Ontario proposals, makes this point. It 
is his conter1tion that the expeditious resolution of actual 
disputes and the development of a sound provincial 
I 
jurisprudence as the two main functions of appellate review 
"cannot be separated. "[46] To talk of cases as being either 
ordinary or general on one hand or law-developing and jur·istic 
on the other will often be artificial and unrealistic. While 
it is true that some cases might be so readily categorised, 
the great majorjty will not. Such an assessment is really 
a matter of degree. Unless the case has been appealed for 
the wrong r·easons it will, of necessity, involve some legal 
issue about which there is room for argument. Given that, 
it is difficult to see how some of these appealscan be 
meaningfully siphoned off, labelled "ordinary'' or "prececlent-
bound" and dealt with by a separate division of the courl. 
Undoubtedly jt is true that some cases stand out for the 
important legal issues they raise. On occasion it may be clear 
from the outset that the case is one which can only sensibly 
be dealt with by the top court. Perhaps the case casts the 
present law into doubt and the top court is required to clarify 
it. Or perhaps the law simply does not adequately meet the 
problem and the top court need to extend or deveJop the law. 
It could be also that the present law is clearly archaic and 
inadequate and the top court must adapt or banish it. 
The distinction then can be drawn. Jndeed the importance of 
doing so has been highlighted in this paper and wiLJ be noU;d 
again in a later discussion on second and leapfrog appeals. 
But to take it too far lends a sense of unreality to thP 
appellate process. The two purposes of appelJate review, 
decisive resolution of disputes and development nnd 
clarification of the law, are so inter·t1,1ined that to divide 
one appeal court on the basis of a 'neat' disLincLion between 
the two would be well nigh impossible. 
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1\s MacDonald points out, and as this paper w.iJl later suggest, 
a two-tiered appellate structure essentially deals with cases 
on the basis of the above distinction (very loosely) but does 
so in a more natural and satisfactory way. 
The l\liakmon 
Having focused on the two main functions of appeal cot1rts 
and suggested that the appellate process is characterjsed 
by a tension between these roles, it will be instructive to 
focus on how this tension manifests itself in pract.ice. 'lhe 
Aliakmon(47] is a case which progressed through the English 
courts and serves the purpose well. 
In July 1976 the plaintiff buyers contracted L.o buy steel 
coils to be shi.pped from Korea to ImminghRm. The price wns 
payable ~Ya 180-day bill of exchange to be endorsed by Lhe 
buyer's bank .in exchange for the bill of ladinq. The buyers 
intended to resell the steel before the bill of lading was 
tendered but were unabl e to find a buyer. As a result. Lheir 
bank refused to back the bill of exchange. The buyers and 
sellers met to resolve the problem. The bi.ll o[ ladiny was 
subsequently sent to the buyers by the sellers and iL was 
agreed in correspondence that the goods would be at the 
disposal of the sellers. The steel coils had been iniproperly 
stowed and damage resulted during the ,,oyage. The buyers 
brought an action against the shipowners clai.ming damages 
for breach of contract and/or duty in respect of the loss 
suffered as a result of the damage to the goods. 
Staughton J, at first instance, upheld the plaintiff's claim 
in contract and thus made no observations as Lo the carrier's 
possible liability to the buyer in tort. The Court of Appeal 
unanimously overruled the lower court's finding on co11tract 
and thus the alternative claim in tort look cenLr·e stage . 
On that issue all three judges found that the carrier was 
not liable in negligence but for very differer1L reasons. At 
the heart of the issue was the principle laJd down (after 
a lengthy analysjs of the authorities) in 'The Wear· 
Breeze. [48J That principle, put simply, is that only the owner 
of goods at the time the damage is do11e can sue i. n tort. The 
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court held that the result of the meetings and correspondence 
between the parties after the bank refused endorseme11L of 
the buyer's bill of exchange was a variatior1 in the contract 
of carriage. That variation \vas t::.o Lhe effect that property 
in the goods would not pass upon consignment and deljvery 
of t.:.he bi 1.1 of lading as origina L l y intended but at a later 
time, namely when the price was paid. Property eventually 
passed after the goods were landed, and thus the rule in The 
Wear Breeze operated to deny the buyer a remedy in tort -
the buyer was not the owner of the goods at tile time the damaqe 
was done. The shipper would have an actior1 in t0rt.:.. by 
contrast, although would have no interest in pursuing it; 
risk having passed to the buyer in accordance witl1 the contract 
of carriage at the commencement of shipment. 
The 1970's saw significant devel.opmenLs in the Law of 
negligence, particularly in the so-cal Led building cases. 
At the apex of that development was the case of Arms v MerLon 
London Borough [ 49 J in which Lord Wilber force ( i 11 the House 
of Lords) lai.d down a si.mple two-fold test by which the courts 
would establish proximil.y between the parties and thus 
liabi.lity. 
Many judges saw the Anns test. as c1 significant change j n Uw 
law. It was literally applied in both England n.nd Ne1t1 Zca1and. 
One such judge was Lloyd J, who in The lrene's Success was[so) 
confronted with a simiJar problem as presented iLseJf in Tile 
Wear Breeze and J.ater in The Aliakmon. He he]d thal Anns had 
effectively changed the law and that were "The \•l ec-Jr Urecze 
being decided today, it would be decided di.fferenLly.
11
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His approach was affirmed a few months L, ter in a cle~r dictum 
by Sheen Jin The Nea Tyhi. L52] 
In The Aliakmon two of the Court of AppeaJ judges acceptf:d 
Lloyd J's finding that the Anns test was <.1pr,ropriaLe r:1.nd that 
The Wear Breeze was no longer good law. Sjr John 
Donaldson MR found, however, that Lhere were poJ. icy reaso11s 
under the second stage of Lord Wilberforce's t es t to deny 
the plaintiff a remedy. Robert Goff LJ helcl thal. the can·jer 
owed Lhe buyer plaintiff a prirna facie duLy or can: a nd t.huL 
there were insufficient policy reasons at stc:1ge t.wo Lo n0.g;1t.ivc 
that duty. Yet because of the nature of a time charter· in 
• 
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operation Lhe shipowner had not breached LhaL duty. The 
plaintiff should have been suing the time charterer. 
The third _judge, Oliver LJ, held Lhat Lhe 1\trns LesL hnd been 
misinterpreted and that The Wear Breeze was noL only still 
good law, but was in accordance with a long line of substanLial 
authority and with the policy of Lhe law today. The House 
of Lords granted the plaintiffs leave to appeal. They did 
so on the tort \issue only. 
Surprisingly, in light of the divergence of opinion jn Lhe 
Court of Appeal, the House of Lords unanimously djs1nJssed 
the appeal. One speech was delivered by Lord Brandon of 
Oakbrook with which the other four lords concurred. It ls 
clear that the House of Lords' broader agenda rnotivaLed 
their decision. The case was an opportuniLy, although noL 
an ideal one, to complete the retreat from the Arms tcsL \,,1h i ell 
had begun in Peabody Donntion Fund (Governors of) v Sit. Lindsuy 
Parkinson and Co Ltd. [ 53] Had the House of Lords Lh ~rnqh t thn l. 
allowing the buyer an actjon in torL on the facLs or 1lle 
Aliakmon was undesirable they could have affirmed the decision 
of the Master of the Rolls in the Court of App .al. That is, 
found that there were policy considerations which or1 the facts 
of the partjcular case led them to conclude LhnL the buyer 
should not have an action in tort. The House of Lords' rn~im c.1r-y 
concern, however, was noL with the details of the facts in 
The Aliakmon but with the direction of Lhe lnw of negliger,ce 
itself. They took the opportunj ty to reaffirm The Wear Bree.1.e, 
overrule Tl1e Irene's Success and Lo put significanL checks 
upon the opLration of the Anns test. 
The Aliakmon i.s a good example of the way in which appell te 
courts at the top of the heirarchy use specific liligr1.Llon 
to supervise the development of Lhe law generally. This is 
especially so as the case was not really enLirely appropriat 
''as the medium to bring some order to the post: Junior L{ooks 
chaos 1n the area of pure economic I oss. '' l ~11 l Markes L n is goos 
on t.o note that 
the choice could have hardly been more unforLunnte 
sj nee the facts were atypical and one of" Lhe cent1·,iJ 
themes of economic loss lit.igalion - Llw floodqates 
argument - is absent from Lhe case. f~~J 
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Ir would have been relatively easy for the House of L,ords 
to find for the plaintiff in this case. 'Ihere wAre few legal 
or practical harriers in their way. The plaintiff cle~rly 
deser-v8d some relief and allowing it would noL, n.S Lhe courts 
sc1y, 'open the floodgates'. Yet the House 0[ Lords had other 
wider consideratjons in mind. They wished Lo clear up the 
law of negligence in the area of pure economic loss und Lhis 
case presented them with the ideal opportun L ty. Per·haµs Lhey 
thought it impracticable or inconvenient to wail for c=1 more 
'suitable' case, especiaJly as judqcs in the Court of Appen1 
1 (such as :Robert Goff LJ) were obvjously going in cl direction 
of which they disapproved. 
\,Jhatever their motives, the case LllusLr;:ites thP dun.j function 
of appellate review well. lt demonstrates also Lhat Lhe Lop 
court's law-making role often compl tely ovc?rshadows the 
details of the particular litigation. 1t is aJso helpful ir1 
the context of djscussion below on the ideal number of appeals. 
Legal issues, The Aliakmon makes clear, fr-equenLly C'me r-gf~ or 
attain importance in the course of the litig~Li on proc ess 
itself and not always in the comparative vacuum of tho 
' solicitor's office. 
JIOW MANY APPEALS ? 
The Proposal 
Having considered the role of appeals Ln our judiciul sysLem 
generally, the Law Commission wenL on to look nL Lhe spe cj fi e 
issue of how many appeals should be avaj Lable. The focus or 
the discussion is particularly upon Lhe desirabiliLy of second 
appeals in light of the important princjpl e s ot' finality and 
prompt litigation and the desire to ensure the most e.tficie.n-r 
use of available resources. r56J 
As already mentioned, the La1rJ Comrnissjon \...Jere requin~d to 
work on the asuumption that the Government would abulish 
appeals to the Judjcial Committee of the Privy Council. Thejr 
final recommendations, in brief, an~ that the Court of Appe,ll 
become New Zealand's highest cour·t and be r-e-narned Uw Supreme 
""' 0 
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Court. The original jurisdiction of the District Courts will 
be enlarged, though not correspondi ngly removed from the High 
Court. Rather, both courts will have an overlapping original 
civil and criminal jurisdicUon. Most of the civil jurjsdicllo11 
will be concurrent although applications for judicial review 
wou.Ld still always be to the High Court. Jn boLh r,he civil 
and criminal jurisdictions either of the parties would have 
the right to apply to a High Court judge for a transfer of 
the case to that court on the grounds of jts complexity or 
general importance. In practice then the High Court will 
continue to deal with the most important civil and cri minal 
cases at first instance. 
Tbe High Court 1r10uld see its appeal business increase, appe,1is 
from the District Court being to panels of Lhree judges. Larger 
panels will sit more frequently in the new Supreme Court, 
although first appeals from the High Court wiJl normully still 
be to a panel of three judges. The Law Commission point ouL 
that 
it is not common in systems like ours for an appeal 
to go from a court of 1 judge to a courL of 5 or 
mor·e. L 57] 
All first appeals 1r1i]l be by right. Second appea l s on questions 
of law, where available, will be by leave of the Supreme Court 
only.[58] 
The Debate 
There is some debate abouL just how nec0ssary a second appefll 
is. It is of particular imporLance in the Low Commission report 
because with the abolition of Privy Council appe~ls second 
appeals from cases begun in the High CourL 1,Jj I] no I onger 
be available. 
The l o s s of t h i s second a pp P- FI l i s no t j n Lcrn Li on cJ 1 b u t n-1 L he r 
incidental to the removal of Irivy Council appea l s. Seco nd 
appeals \·Jill still be avajlab l e on rno sL oc r:os ions, buL not 
from cases begun ir1 the High Court. The questjon is whether 
Lhis loss will matter. 
In J.978 the Royal Commis sion on Lhe Courts Look Ltie opporLun i ty 
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to present the jssues surrounding the aboli.tion of Privy 
Council appeals. Of necess ity thaL jnvolved look at Lhe 
need for a two-ti e r appel Late system. The Roya l Commission's 
conc lusjon was "that a t.1,Jo- ti er i1ppe 1 ! ale sysLcm is n desir;,ble 
ideal."[59) However it accepted that if Privy Councjl apµedls 
were removed'' ... it will be so diffjculL as to be impractical 
to create a completely new fi.nal court .... '' The rec1sons a 1e 
obvious. New Zealand and its l ega l p1·ofessi on are s mal l a nd 
would not be able to absorb such a sig ni ficdnt addltjo11 to 
the court structure. It would dlso, of course, be very 
expensive. At least until New Zealand's populatior1 i ncreases 
"a single appeal would have to be r:\ccepted in man y 
circumstances. "[60) 
One solution. suggested by the District Court Judges in t he ir 
s ubmission to the Law Commi ssion , is t hat the~ Distri.ct Courts 
become the only court of f Lrs L ins Lance. This v-JO IJ Id .involve 
u. d1-arnati c c hange in the court structure as we krn)w it, th<: 
High Court becoming an intermediate Court of Appeal. lt is 
fair to say that such a radical restructuring co11ld not be 
justified simply on t he basjs of mnintain ing c.1 second right 
of appeal in all cases. 
What, then. are the arg ume nts for and aga insL sccund apped l s; 
or rather are th e arguments for them so compe I l i nq t h<1 L Lhr, i r· 
l oss should cause concern? The diffi.cuJLy with debr1te in New 
Zea land on this issue is that jnevitably it b0comes bound 
up wiLh the question of Privy Council arp1="c1ls <1boul 1,11hich 
people can be surprisingly e motive . WhethPr the Privy C0uncil 
should continue to be our finul Qp pelJnLe co tH'L is quiL0 a 
differe nt issue to the desirabiJ i ty of second appeals 
generally. 
The Case against two Appeals 
1\s mentione d a bove, i L is wide 1 y accepted Lila L o n ~) ,1ppr:a l 
is sufficient to ensure jusUce belwecn liLiganLs. ln England 
the House of Lords hears very f e w Appeals - on averc:1qe beLween 
60 and 80 each year - wh i 1 e there a re some ,UOO j ud gme n ts 
in the Queen's Bench Divisi.o n. Jn New Zea l a nd beL\..;0en l and 
5 appeals mny go to the Privy Council in a n y one yPar while> 
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there have been some 500 or GOO r j nR l r, L v i 1 j udgmen ts j n the 
High Court. [61] Undoubtedly l.he New Zealand figLir·e is affected 
by the distance and expense involved in t1aving to Lravel Lo 
London, but sttll i.t seems c l ear thEJL only a very small numbct-
of cases ever get as far as a second appeal. Many smaller 
states in the United St<'ltes have onJy one appellHte tier, L62] 
although the federal Supreme Court exists Lo heRr appeals 
on important constitutional questions. Their experience does 
not indicate that a ldck of a second appeal causes any obvious 
injustice. Those slates in the United States which have created 
intermediate appeal cout·ts have usually done so because of 
overcrowding in the top court and not to provide liLjgants 
\..Jith a second appeal. Indeed Overt.on no Les in his assessment 
of F' lorida' s three tj er court structur·e that "providing c1 
second appeal was clearly not the purpose for creating 
Florida's District; CourLs. "L6J! 
Those who doubt the value of second appea J s poj nt. ouL Lh 21 t 
ljtigation is not about achieving perfect solutions to 
legal problems. It is not some academic exerc i so. l L in t he 
vast majority of cases, justice is done \vilh onJy one appeal 
what is the point of a second? While acknowledgi ng LhaL second 
appeals do have their uses, doubters argue Lhat Lhe advantages 
derived by the legal system and society from second appeals 
are not sufficient to justify the resources lhc1L hc1ve lo be 
devoted to them. Besides, where does one slop? rr Lwo appeals 
are necessary why not more ? 
The reality is that 1r1 i th many questions of 1 c.1w Uiere c1re no 
'right' answers. Decisions handed down by Lhe Lop court are 
'riqht' simply by virtue of the fact. that i L is Lhe top couct 
giving them. Indeed judges at the top of the cout·L heirarchy, 
with equal jntelliqence, exper·ience and knowledge of the law, 
can reach quite different conclusjons on Lhc sume points of 
law. One United States Supreme C'ourl judge had no doubt tllat 
were there a right to appea L beyond Lhr~ Supr e rn e Court a 
proporl~ion of such appeuls would succeed. L 64 I 
Two or more appeals are then, according to Lheir detrac:tors, 
wasteful. There Ls very little meriL in second ar,pcals per 
se. it js urgued. The merit rather is iri tile C,ct Lhn.L ot Len 
• 
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on the second appeal the matter has fLnal ly rcr1ched tlle lduhest 
court and can be conclusively dealt wiLh. Tlte Law Commission 
noted this view, which re9ards the number of prior head ngs 
or appeals as largely insiqrd fi cant. 
ln the end the most criUcal mattet· i.s that appeals 
in important matters should be able Lo be taken to 
the final court. in our J.eqal system and be qiven a 
full and fair hearing there.(65] 
This view is lent support by lhe provisjon for leaptrog appeals 
by leave from the District Court to the Supreme CourL; 
a feature of the Law Comrnissj on' s proposed cour·t structure. L b6 J 
However leapfrog appeals t1ave been relatively rare to date 
and the LavJ Commission envisage this continuiny-. They Lruly 
are the exception, occuring in cases where ''mnjor issues of 
princip1e'' have emerged at first i.nslance. f6'7] Proponents 
of second appeals would in no way see th leapfrog provision 
as inconsistent with a two-tier appellate structure. Ruther, 
as a means by which unnecessary duplicaLLun can be eliminaLcct, 
it complements and enhances the system . 
. The Cnse for two Appeals 
What. of arguments in favour of second appE-;i.l ! s? The fkpor·t 
of the Royal Commission noted the view ''Lhut cl second rjqht. 
of appP.al is necessary to provide the opporLunity for lcqnl 
a r·gument to develop and mature, with the issues bei11g 
cryslallised and refined. "[681 Lawyers d, not hc:J v c Lhe luxury 
of days and days to prepare for l i LigaL ion; to ponder t.he 
i.ssues and e nsure that alJ fine Jegal points r·,~l1;\1c1nt Lo Lhc 
problem are cavassed. Nor, it is pert. i nen t t·o no tr'; , cou I cl 
the parties afford it. Cons-t[·aints of tLme bolh on the collrLs 
and on advocates moan that important poinLs uTe not perhclps 
dealt wi th as thoroughly ss they would be in Lhe id o:-).:-11 uorlrl. 
Indeed raising such poi.nts may be irrelevnnL nt Lhe Um' oC 
the trial. The arg ument is thal many issues sut·f;:ice or be<'< 1rne 
more imporLan t during the course or the J Lt, i q ,1l iu11 i Ls<" 1 f. 
The litigation process, v1tdch sl.i 11 to a l c:1rge exlent . ccnLres 
on the oral presentation or argumenL, v,;ill t1ighliqht so111P 
issues while others fall by tile waysjd. 
The l\l i akmon l j tiga t Lon, discussed above, dc•mnns tr,:1 LQs t.h is 
• 
~ 
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process. /\t first insLance the plainliff ' s clai.m \..;as 
alternatively based 1Jpon contract and tort. The plaintiffs 
won on contract and the tort issue was thus not judicjally 
considered. In the Court of Appeal the first Jnstance decision 
on contract was reversed and the tort issue considered. While 
the clai m in tort was unanimously dismissed by the Court of 
Appeal, their reasons were so disparate that the decision 
begged to be appealed. In the House of Lords only the narrow 
tort issue was argued in detail before five of England's Lop 
judges and was firmly resolved. 
The issues were refined as the litigation proceeded. By the 
time the case reached the House of Lords one important legr1J 
issue remained outstanding. The hLghest court could devote 
all their attention to that ".Jne issue and consequentlr their 
decision would, on that issue, be ber.ter than that. given by 
the court below. 
The Al iakmon litigation al so demonstrates the \,Jay in wh i eh 
a heirarchical courL strucLure, \..Jith two appertls, naturally 
allocates different types of work to the different courts. 
The first appeal is general, the court lc"trgely yoinq through 
a.11 the arguments heard at the trial. They cannoL devote much 
time to the potentially important legal issues in the case 
but deal with them along wj th <..1J 1 other· f.~1cels of l:lle oppec.11. 
A second appeal by contrast, usually only by leave, 
concentrates clearly on only one or Lwo LmporLant points of 
law which have emerged in the courts b0low and remain 
unresolved. By virtue of tllat fact alone the cout·L hr1.ndlinq 
the second appeal will be able tu resolve lhose issues in 
a more sa U sfactory way than a busier court hand l J ng a gener ·a l 
appeal. The top court, t:h8n, is deal i.ng with litigation in 
which there is a strong pub l i c- Ln L-eres t componen L. Th , 
ind tvidual li tlgants are of course important, the case would 
not be then~ without them. But nor would the case be Lhere 
unless the issues it raised required the top court, to exercise 
lts role of clarification and developmer1L. The twu-ti.ered 
appellate process in England has b8cn descrLbed in this way: 
The lower courts 
deal with an infinite var·iety an<l a huqe bulk of 
litigation, necessari.ly in a somewhat summary D!1d 
at i; ux:-=-- ---~-1 --------------------_.....,
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perfunctory way. Thus ... L thE~ l ... inLerrnediaLe courts 
of appeals have relativel' large case-loads and perform 
an invaluable function in C'orrectjng judicial 
fc.1.lJibility and bringing an PJement of consistency 
to the grc1ss-roots of the judjcjnl process. The House 
of Lords is at the centre of Lhe system: iLs smaJ l 
case-load . . . includes only the creme d la creme of 
legal conundra ... which require the most weight.y 
consideration and which have Lhe widest imr>Lications 
in raising issues of general public importance. L69] 
This view of the court structure and of the second appeal 
within it has been described as the "stepping stone'' 
approach. [70) The first appea) both sharpens legal issues 
and determines factual issues. L711 Jn the vast m~jor·ity of 
cases that appeal \vi l1 be sufficient:. l-lowcver in a f w, 
importan t legal issues may remain unrE::solved or inadequnl.ely 
resolved. Those cases are Lhe diet.. oft.he top court. Critics 
of this so-called stepping stone approach decry the 
reproduction of effort and the cost to both the JjLiqants 
and state that such dup l i eat ion j nvo l ves. l'-lr1ny such crit i cs 
prefer an allocation procedur·e, such as thut propos ,d in UnLr1r ·io 
and as found in some Ameri can sLaLes, Wisconsj1i being a usclul 
example. [72J Such procedures allocate cases Lo differenL cour·ts 
or different divisions within the on e court according to theLr 
'type'. Humdrum appeals go to one cour-t: \'1hi l e public interest 
''law-making" appeals go to the top court . In Wisconsin c;:ises 
are divided into three broad caLegories for Lhjs purpos . 
Problems t'1i t.h ttns approach ho.ve been outJ ined Lo some ex Lent 
above. In addition to Lhose points two others n8cd to be mad 
fjrstly, r.he µrocess o.f aJ locatjon may itself" bo faulLy or 
at least questionable, especial.ly where yo ung Qnd i.nexper iP.n ced 
judges' clerks exercise the alloca.t.ion responsibiliLy. This 
difficulty is surmounted in some staLes by r.he use of other 
procedures, for example certification of cases by the lowe r· 
court. [7 3 ] 
The second problem .is more perti.nent to this pr sent 
discussion. That is that such a ystem implies tho.t the law-
making role of Lhe courts is confined to one super-Lribunal 
at the top of the heirarchy. Jn n two-Lier· appclJatc sLructure 
the reality is quiLe differenL. Th fjrsL ;ippeaJ LS noL just 
a stepping stone for t .he U tLgaLion as i L proccecis inExorably 
t01,Jards a hearing in the highest cotH't. /\ second ,"'iPP8,ll is 
ver-y much the exception and noL the ruie. The intc nm~diatc 
--------~~-----= cI LGUL 
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appellate court itself periorms an important Jaw-making +~nLti 0 n 
Rnd thereby exerc i.ses considerable influe nce over the 
development of the law. Bolh the English and New Zealand CourLs 
of Appeal are good examples of Lhat. 
The fact that there are so few second nppeals a lso answers 
the charge that they are wasteful. Delay, lack of finality 
and increased costs are not realJy serious concerns given 
the few second appeals that proceed. Furthermore the 
duplication argument implies that the issues at Lhe end of 
the first appeal are exactly as they were al the end of l.he 
first instance hearing. Allocation, it is argued , would have 
spotted the important issues and sent the case straight tu 
the top court obviating the n8ed for an intermediate appeal. 
This fails to take account, however, ol the crys t·al Lisa.lion 
effect of the litigation process. lt may "'1e l1 be, cis in The 
Alia:kmon, t:hat issues worthy of Lhe Lop courL do not e merge 
un ti 1 the first appeal. And in those cases in \.Jtd e h j mporLa n L 
issues have emerged during the trial the leapfrog facili.Ly 
is a safeguard against unnecssa ry dupljcaLjon. 
ln any event some sort of allocation procRdure does not 
necessarily purge all duplication from Lhe system. The Onlario 
Committee, for example. envisaged appeals (witl1 leave) from 
the General Sect ion of Lhe rirovi nc i al Supremo CotH"L to tl1e 
Juristic Section. [741 That \,JOuld presumably be nccessQry in 
situations where the case had been wrongly all 1c:aLed ini tic-d Jy 
or where issues requiring the 'law-making' experlise of Lhe 
Juristic Section arose in Lhe course uf or HS a result of 
the general appeal. In addition, of course, tlwre would be 
the possibility of a further appedl to the Supreme Court. of 
Canada. MacDonald's · conclusion is thaL 
. . . a L Lhough the narrm" j ssue of time and cos L sav i rl<J 
impe J led the Comm i t tee to recommend i:'1 bi 1 u r·ca Li on or 
the Court of Appeal rather than U-1e creuU C>n of anoLhor 
appellate court, this res rucluring, in f" ;JcL, doos 
not pr-omise a c h eaper or more expediLious appellate 
procedure. [75] 
A final point in favour of a t\,.,o-tier appel la Le structure 
has to do with the naLure oi the top c:ourL itself . The Lnw 
7, 6. 
Commission recognised that the top court Ln a system such 
as New Zealand's is a body of great significance. lt has Lhe 
''final reponsibility ... for clarifying and d 'vlopinq the 
Jaw ... , '' a responsibil.ity descrilJed by Lile Cvmmissjon as 
"major and critical ... in our system of conslitutional 
qovernmenl. ['76] It i.s a court unlike any other in Lhe judicial 
system. It hears the 'creme de Ja creme' of cases. !Ls iudges 
are ideally held in high regard because of Lheir senioriLy, 
expertise and experienc8. Furthermore the courL should be 
srnal l ; "a permanent group of appellate judges meeLing in c1 
collegiate way the responsibLlLLies of the fina.l court of 
our system of justice. "[77] In many jurisdjctions t·he unique 
character of the top court is nchieved in Large measure because 
of the type of cases heard. The l j tigation wi lJ have traversed 
at least one appeal, the top court thus be.ing presented wi Lh 
one or two specifj_c legal issues upon which they c,rn bring 
their unparalleled legal prowess to bear. 
The House of Lords, the Supreme Cour-Ls of the Unit<~d Slates 
and Canada and the High Court of Australia are all examples 
of top courts, in jur isdj et ions similar to OlH' own, 1r1hich 
hear almost only second appeaJs. Rel-:. aining a t1,,Jo-t ier appel lnte 
structure helps to preserve these urd que Lop colirts. The 
quality of their decisj_ons must surely be enhanced -,s they 
have longer to ponder fewer rarefied legnl issues. 
A top court o[ this nature is nJ L the more LmportAnt toddy 
because of the great expectaUons placed upon our judicial 
system. Society has become more complex and as· result more 
litigious. Concomitantly the courts have, as dis -ussed .:::iboVf', 
been increasingly called upon to 'develop' and 'clarify' Lh 
la \-J. A two-Lier appellate structure nalurally sitts liLiquLion 
until the top court, if and 1r1hen i.t is confr·onLecl wilh an 
issue, is pr·imarily requjred Lo exercise its lHw-mukinq or 
c: 1 a r i f y i n g fun c t ion . Th j s n r:J r-r ow focus b '> c:1 s nw l l co u r L 
onsistLng or judges of Lhe hiqhesL cc.1J Lbte ensures thr1L thE Lr 
decjsions are not only coherenL and consisLenL out o( a vecy 
high standard - to the benefit of the who 1 c l E'<Jr1l sys Lem . 
.Lt is submitted, therefore, Lhat second app0als are possibly 
more necessary now than Lhey have ever bcPr1. Avr1LlAhiliLy 
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of a second appeaJ. will, to a Jarqe extenL, ensure Lhat the 
courts do not fall down on their increasingly import~nL law-
making responsibililies. 
THE L~W COMM1SS10N'S FIND[NGS 
In one sense the Law Commission hAve asked more questions 
than they have answered. Those questions, in relation to 
appeaJs. were appropriate and important. An examination of 
the Commission's Report reveals their conclusjons on some 
of the issues raised. 
Firstly, the Law Commission is not averse Lo second appeals. 
Indeed they emphasise that the.i r re,~ommendation~. j f adopted, 
will result in more second appeo.ls. [781 In Pctrlicular, ''a 
.lc1.r-ger number of criminal matters would be the subject of 
two appeals than is currently U1e case. "[79] 
It could be that this increase in second appeals is simply 
incjdental to the widening of the District Courts' original 
jurisdiction. The second appenl is not necessat·ily meriLot·ious 
in itself but simply necessary in a heirarchi8al court 
stn1cture to get some matters to the top court. This approc1ch 
is evident to some extent in the Law Commission's repo1 ·t. 
The Commission certainly view the proposed Surremt~ Cour·L' s 
supervisory ro J e as of paramoun L .import c:1nce. Tllc~y s La Le Uw l 
"it should be possible for matters oriqinat, ing jn any cour-L 
or tribunal to come before the Supreme Court if LhL issue 
j s one of major public importance. "r 00] Further, Lhe Sup rem 
Court's exercise of overall control over- major orec1s of law 
and legal policy can be achieved. "through second <Jppeals as 
weJl as through first appeals. "[81J 
It could be argued therefore that seco!ld appeals l'l/i 11 exist 
only as the means by which the Supreme Court supervises luwAr· 
courLs. Thus second appeals from DisLricL Court decisions 
can be justifi.ed on the basis Lhat with firsl c.1precds being 
decided by different p<lnels in the l!igh Court Dile unified 
Lribunal js sL.ill required over them to cnsun~ consisL.m1cy 
and correct errors. The Law Commission in fnrL point ouL U1At 
l 
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where appeals cannot al presenL be taken beyonu the High CourL 
inconsistency has resulted. [82] This indr~ed has been used 
as one of the justifica tions for Lile conlinucd existence of 
the House of Lords as En<Jland's Lop judi.ci3l body. \,Jilh the 
English Court of Appeal now sitting in varLous divisions one 
final superior body over them is required t.o ensure consistency 
and coherence in the law. [83] 
There are indications in the Law Commission's report however 
that they view second appeals as more than simply a necessary 
if not altogether desirable means of geLting cases to the 
top court . Like the Royal Commission before them. although 
perhaps less explicitly, the Law Commission appear to accept 
the view that a two - tier appellate structure is desirabl 
in itself. 
Firstly, for Lhe reason that 111 comp\ ica\.l'd ·rnd imporL;Jrit 
litigation the three tier structure refir1es and C"ryslnll.ises 
issues . They are quick to poinL out that "l nw- mcikinq" is noL 
confi.ned to second appeals ;:_rnd reject the notion th.:it.. <.1 rjqid 
distinction can be drawn between first appenls (conce1·ncd 
with the correction of error) and second apµeals (concerned 
h1ith clarification and development. of Llic Jm;).fB4] How.,vcr 
they refer on more than one occasion to the "specia l d1c-,1ucLer'' 
of second appeals in 1.r1h ich "the emphasis Ls on I lie cou r· t' s 
role of reviewing, clarifying a nd, j f approµrLrJl.e. devrdopi 11q 
the law and less on the particular case. ''18~] ElsPu!wr·e Lhe 
Commission ackowledge that a second appeal "i. s lnss conr.ern ~d, 
in the overall order of things. with con·ectj n g C'JTor in ttw 
particular case and more with the c l arjfi.catio n nnd devPl.opmunL 
of the law. "[86] Tlle Commission aµpear, then, to acce:r:,L the 
view thaL one appeal will, in the vast maj o r·iLy of cases, 
be sufficient to ensure justice for the individual lj Uga11L. 
But in addition that second nprea lf»are importa nt., jn th is 
Litigious age, as the means by which the top court can exei-c is e 
their role of clarification dnd developrn nt of Lile Law mosL 
effectively. 
This approach .raises further quesUons, f),H ticulc1rly r1.houL 
1.r1hether this is L1ir to Litiqants who ultimnlr·ly bear Lhc 
cost [8 1 ] and whether it is desirable thc.1t Llie dev,~lopmcnL 
l 
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of the Common Law be dependenL upon the lvhi ms and tactics 
of litigants. [881 An examination of Lhose issues is beyond 
the purview of this paper. 
A second reason for the Law Commission's dPJ)uranL acceptance 
of the desirability of a two-tier appellale srrucrure is thnL 
it helps preserve the un i.que churc.1cler of Lhe top court. Foi-
example, the Commission consider it desjrable thdt routine 
criminal appeal business be handled by Lhe High Court with 
only those cases involving important "issues of p1- inciple'' 
makj ng it to the Supreme Court. [ 89] Thj s v i G\•J accords w i t.h 
the practice of other jurisdjC'tions, discussP.d .Jbove, 1n which 
the top court hears only second appeals invo1vi11q issues \vhi.ch 
have emerged jn or arisen as a result of liLigation in the 
courts below. The two-Lier c.1ppeJ laLe strucLure thus ensures 
that the top court avoids geLting boqqed d01,m in routine 
appellate business. The result is, hopefully, be tLor quGLiLy 
decisions in the most important or cases. 
The requiremenL for leave Lo appeal a second Lime, as proposed 
by the La1t1 Commiss-Lon, and Lhe requirement LtwL such appeals 
be 1 imi ted to questions of la1t1 complements this view of Lhc 
role of the second appeal. 
F .inally, the Commission's who1e pc0posed sLrucLtH"e, 1,1ith two 
appeals from the Di.strict Court, suggesLs approval of Lhc 
ref-Lnement of issues approach. lndeed the Commission rcijecLed 
sugqes ted alternatives to a simple progn=, ss ion up the courL 
he-Lrarchy. (90] A principal consjder-ation, Jor examplP in noL 
al lowing appeals from the District Court to l.tw proposnd 
Supreme Court as a ma L Ler of cota-se in any c i r c ums Lances, 
ls the workload of the top court. I\ two-Licr ...ippcll,Jte 
structure safeguards the top courL from f.JVf-'CCT01.,.1rl.i ng and Lhe 
two earlier hec1rlngs ensure thaL Lhe Supn)mc CourL has on] y 
to deal with c1 fe\v well-defined, not to mention imporlcrnt, 
legal issues. In the 1,1ords of Lh Commissiun, Lhere ani rea1 
advantages, in terms of the del1berc1t rr> v iP~v, 
clarification and ,as c1µpropriat..e. duveloprnenL or Lhe 
law, of having a cureful assessment of U-w j sstws hy 
counsel and a court at Least once bcifo1 n a case acts 
to the Supreme Court. [ 91] (Emphusi.s ,1<..'lcled 1 
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PROBLEMS WITII T!IE: PROPOSED STRUCTUR~ 
There are. it is submitted, probloms with the Law Commission's 
proposed structure to do wit.h bol.ll seconct appeals and Lhe 
nature of the Supreme Court. The first. issue concerns Lhe 
loss of second appeals from actions begun in the Hi.gh CourL. 
This possible loss concerned the Royal Commission in 1978[921 
although they recognised Lhat abolition of Privy Council 
appeals would make it inevitri.ble. [931 The Law Commission. 
by contrast, do not mourn the loss of this sec0nd appeal. 
Jn response to the suqgestion that the siLuaLion wi.11 be 
anomalous. in that actions begun in Lhe District courts wi Ll 
have two appeals available, the Law Commission met-ely noted 
that "such a difference may of course occur whenever, there 
are two first instance courts. i94] 
Concern about the loss of second appe'-lls from !Ugh Court 
litigatjon centres upon the appdrant inconsistency in the 
svstem. Two appeals will b e possibl0- from actions hegun in 
the District Court: firstly tCJ Lhree J!igh Court judges and 
secondly (subject to the yrunLlnq of lenve) to (prohnblyJ 
five or more Supreme Court judges. [95] However only one appeal, 
normally to a panel of three, v,.:ill be available jrorn deci.sions 
of first instance in the Hiqh Court. The irony ls. of 
course. that t.he J rJtter cases will be the most important. and 
complex in Lhe civl l and criminal are,nas. Th y ar'e tile ver·y 
cases. i. t. con be argued. from whi eh scc:on<l apper.1 ls would 
potentially be the most useful. 
The anomaly can of course be rc1Li onal ised. Of mosL 
significance, it is urgued, is Ll\at lmpor·LanL cases be heard 
in the final courL. Whether it he on fir ·st or second appeal 
is of no consequence. The second appeal from first insLance 
hearings in the Dislrlct Court i.s jusLifinblo firstly as a 
means of qetting matters before Liu~ Supreme Court. nnd seco11dly 
as the Wc:JY in which the Supremf: Court c;:in ultimaLRly supervise 
tht-"! deve 1 opmen t of the I aw. Thc1 t is. Lo ensure Ll1a L no 
inconsistency occurs as a t' esult of fir ·st appenls being heard 
by disparate panels in Lile High Cour·L. In a Lhn~<' LLer cout- t 
strucLure t.he s .cond appual .is a me,-e device, or a neccssa r·y 
mechanism. by which important cas8s fr-om Lhe DisLricL Court 
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can be laid bc~f ore l he Supreme Court . 
Yet that, it is submitted, is i.Lsclf an ack110wledgmenL U1c1L 
a t,wo-tiet· appellate sLn1cLun,, j s i nhPrenLl y v1orlh1r1hi le ns 
a means of refining and crystallLsing jssues. lt is an 
acknowledgment that afLer· a firsl instance hf'aring a11d one 
appeal unresolved lega I issues may remain outst.:rnding. The 
Supreme Courl will then, on the second appeal, be called upon 
to exercise its law development or clari.ficalion function. 
That, as the Law Commission point out, i.s L.hc nature of second 
appeals. 
No doubt it could be argued Lhat second appeals Lo the Supreme 
Court wjll exJst only so that the court may exercise its 
supervisory and error-correction funcLions over High Court 
appeals. That ,,1ill, in part, be Lhe case. llowever there will 
a Ls o be cases j n which, afler Fl hearj ng nnd < n~ appeal, Lhe 
law is still unclear. The lliqh Court pc1ncl m;.w noL necessarily 
have misapp_l ied the law but, as in The l\l j akmo11 , Lhey may 
have reached d j ff eren L cone l us ions as to wh,1 t l he lav1 is. 
The Dench might be spU L or their reasuning so varied thaL 
a second appeal i_s re 11uired to clarif'y 01 develop LhP l.-1w. 
That vjew of a t\,,JO-tier appellc,t.e str-ucLLW is, it. seems, 
impli.ciLly accepted by the Lo.w Cornmissjori. [ 971 
If that refinement model of double appeals js c1µpr<J[H iaLn 
for litigation begun i.n the Di s tr-ict CourL, why rwL for LhnL 
begun in the Hiqh Courl? The djstLnction could be: L\Jc1t the 
hearing a nd first appeal are in courls furl.hc1 up LhLl 
heirarchy, and that us~result jssues will be sejzed upon 2rnd 
dealt with in a more satisfactory \..Jay U1,,n in the l)i_sLr·icL 
c.rnd High Courts. The view of double appeals, however , as a 
means by which complex issues can be r·cfin0u and crystn1 I isc'cl 
is aµplicable Lo al! courts in the heirar·chj. Besides, any 
difference there mighL be as a r<:->sult of Lh liliqati.on 
beginning in the '::_:;upcr· Lor· Hi_qh CourL would in parL be~ 
neutralised by the mor djifi_cult nilLurc or lh;~t, li_Ligr.1Lion. 
The whole c:1rgument about second apµeals js Lhnl re(Jardless 
of 1r1hat court Lhe matter is f'iL ·sL hcanl i11 there m,1y be 
issues t,ha L erner-ge i. n Lhe cou r ·s , of Lhe I i Li <Jd Li on, n s :i n~su 1 \ . 
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of (amongst other things) oral interaction bc)L\vecn bar and 
bench, which could not have been anticipaLed by counsel. That 
this happens does not reflect badly on the parlies or the 
court. lL is, quite simply, Lhe nature of LlH~ '1:Jer1st'. 'l'hn 
Alial<mon liligation again serves as a useful case jn point. 
Imagine that action. under the Law Commlssion's proposed 
structure, was begun i.n the High Court. 'J'he l!igh Court decide 
the matter in favour of the plaintiff on the basis of contract. 
On appeal the case would in all probability go Lo a panel 
of three L97) in the Supreme Court. The tort issue suddenl)' 
becomes crucial and those three judges reach q11i.t diffe~enL 
conclusions on that issue. The resulting uncerLr.1inLy in t li e 
Jaw could only be remedied in a laLer case. A possible 
so lution, that the matter go to a fuJl bench or Lhe 
Supreme Court (or to at le.::ist five) . is no t desir, ble Ln Lhe 
Law Commission's view; it involves judgPs ··or one court sitl.inq 
o ri appeals from their colleagu es . "L981 
A furt her problem with the loss of the second appeal has Lo 
do \,.1i th the n ature of the proposed Supreme Court i tse 1 f. Th 
Law Cummission see the court as being u1 Li male l y r·esponsibJ e 
for the development of New Zeala nd' s Commo n Law. l\nd they 
have also observed that in our heirarchical structure Lhis 
function is most obviously exerc lsed in ll\e conLexL of as cond 
ap pea 1. The second appeal does have a ''special cllarac Lei- '' 
a nd it is no co incid ence Lhat i.n oth er like jurisclictiuw· 
the top court's work consists almost entirely of second c:ipped l s 
heard by l eave of that court. This ensures that the l1ighesL 
court is dealing only \,.1ith Lhe most imporLanL l e(Jal Jssues. 
They can devote all thejr time to t hose jssues wiLhouL the 
distraction of more routine litigation. 
Our ne w Supreme Court will be in quite a di fCer nt posi Uon. 
They wi 11 be dealing not only with i mpor·lan t second appea.l s 
and with the occasional special public jnterest ca.se 
ori.gina L l y l 99] but wi Lh routine aenera I appcc1J s by riqhL fr-om 
the High Court. [f parties often choose to begin imporLnnL 
liligation in the Hi gh Court. [ lOOJ even Lhough the o r,L i o n 
to begin -Ln the District CourL 1r1jll exisL, Lhe ne1r, Supreme 
Court's 1r1ork will dif(er liLtle fro m that or Lhc Court of 
Appeal at present. 
33. 
Tile fear .is t.h;1t a mi.x of rouLinc first ::iµpcals by riqhL fr(Jm 
the High CourL and second appeals by leave will dislract the 
Supreme Court from their "major and cri.tic;-11 responsibility 
in our sysLem or constiLutionR1 government," t<H' cl,ffi fr inq 
and developjnq the la1,1.L]OlJ No doubt Lhe courL \'1ill cope 
with this dual function. \'et jf the Supreme Court's primr1ry 
role is to finally resolve imporL~nt rarefied legal issues 
one cannot help wondering if the expected t1iyh quality of 
decision making will. be compromised because they are also 
being asked to dispose of unexceptional routine appellate 
business. 
CONCLUSION 
The report of the Law Commi sss ion on the Structure of t~he 
Courts is in many respects an 8dmirable documenL. Their 
proposals are sympathetic to New Zealand's Lraditional court 
structure and their research thorough. Tt1Js pnper has be~n 
concerned principally with their observaLions and proposals 
on appeals. 
The Law Commission raise imporlant issues in Lheir reporL 
about the role of firsL and second appeaJs in our judicL1l 
system. In onJ y a fc1r1 respects is Lhei r comm<.)ntary 
disappointing. Firstly, having noted Lhc Common Lr=n-1's 
t..rad i tionaJ Gnli pa thy Lowards appeals, ilrtd hdvirtll cot rcct l y 
highlighted the poLential for ;:-:ippeals Lo be unr1f:cessury ond 
wasteful, th Commission fail to exµJore tlH~ extent of present 
'abuse' of the system . In particular, the possibiliLy of first 
appeals in cjvil litigation being by leave: only mi.ghL 
profitably have been examined. 
Secondly, theit' comments on double appeals do not adequately 
deal wiLh the issues they Lhemselvcs r.:1ise on thjs matLer. 
The value or necessity of second oppenls tnk ·son prominence 
as nn issue becuuse, wi Lh Lhe obol i tion or c1ppei::l1S to the 
Privy Council, a second appeal from firsL insLance Hiqh CourL 
litigation will be lost Ln the proposed new sLrucLure. ln 
J 978 Lhe RoyaJ Commission on U,e Courts made i L e1cnt' Lhdt 
t.t1ey looked forwnrd to Lhis Joss with some trepid~Lion. 
'flCTORI" I I • ' • 
3'1. 
The Law Commission· s view however is not, tn the end, clear·. 
Some of their comments suggest Uwt second appeals themselves 
are of little inherent value. Of n~al signific-ance is that 
important matters reach the Lop emu L. WheLhPr Ll,r1L be on 
first or second appeal or even ori.ginnlly is of Jil.Lle 
consequence. If that is the Law Commission's view LhA existence 
of two appeals from firsL instance hearings i.r1 Lhe District 
Court but only one from fi.r·st instance lligh Court. liUgaLion 
is in no way inconsistent. They exjst in thA first case simply 
c.1s a convenient mechanism by 1r,tdch deserving District, C0u1- t 
coses can r·each the Supreme Court rnther than because second 
appeals ore desirable per se. They also scn_; e, j n th rt t con u,x t, 
as a means of keeping the workload or the Lop court al 
manageable levels. 
On another view, however, a two-tier app~lJaLe structure is 
itself considered rlesira.ole because it sen/f")S Lo r e line a.rid 
crystall.ise issues thereby enhancing th courL's role as 
overseer, cJarjfier a.nd developer of the IA.w. JL is Lhis 
writer's observation that this view is JenL greater credibi l lLy 
by development of Lhe 1 aw-mak:i ng function of nppel Lal,~ co11rLs 
since the 1950's. By Lhe Urne li.Ligalion mHkes a second r.1ppe al 
the outstanding legal i.ssues nre ususally well-defined and 
the top court, whose expertise is lheor ti.cally unpar·c:1llclnd, 
can spend time on Lhose spec j f ic issues and e mP,rqe 1rJi l h c1 
satisfactory resolution . Second nppcals iJppear nt1turally l.lien 
to have more to do wilh the judiciary's la\.,;-making !unction 
t ha n 1rJ.i t h j t s d i s p u t e re so 1 u t i on or error co t Te c t i on fun c L i ons . 
Thus to n~move second c1ppea ls at a lime \,Jhen Lhe judiciary' s 
law-mal<: .inq rolo, by their own admission, i •..; more i mporL,rnL 
than ever before seems a little Qbsurd. 
Some commc11ts in the Law Commiss Lori's r ,por-L suggest 
endorsement of this laLter vie1r1 of Lhe two-tier appellaL<' 
process - that it is g nerally desi.rabJe in iLseJf (though 
not always necessary) no matter what r~ourL the fjrst inslc'rncP 
hearing is before. lf thi.s is the view oft.he Law Commission 
(as it 1r1as of the Hoyal Commission in 19'18) Lhen New Zealand's 
future court structure could wcl l harbour a sioniflc c.rnt 
anomaly. That t.hey make little of it pr·ob bly n ~flecLs Lhe 
fact that Lhere is no realistic .-il Lcn1at.iv0.. \olhi Je second 
---------~-----~c CC ULc,-----~""T""~-----------------------:= ..-
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appeals ar.e themselves desirc1ble, the bene[i.Ls to be qai ned 
from them \,JOuld not be suffi.ci.enL to justif1 the radi.cu.L 
restrucLurlny of the court sysL m required Lo retain them 
in all cases. 
The Law Commi ssi.on 's proposed court structure 1,1i 11 then hrl\ff: 
weaknes s es . The loss of second appcu ls in some cases \v ill 
be one. AnoLher will, as discussed ~bove. he the raLher 
eclectic nature of the Supremt~ Court's workload Lo tlle pos~.;jb1P 
detr·ime nt of their law-making function. However given New 
Zealand's small population and the 1 imjLs on avc:1ilabl e 
resources these compromises wi]l si mpl y, in Lhe wo,-ds of Ltv~ 
Royal Commission, "have to be accepted.'' [ 102 J 
-- - -- / /-----
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